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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
CONTINENTAL REPUBLIC CORPO-
RATION, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent) 
-vs.-
THE SECURITIES COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, 
Defendant and Appellant. 




Continental Republic Corporation, the plaintiff be-
low and respondent here, and hereinafter referred to as 
Continental, brought suit against the Securities Com-
mission of Utah, hereinafter referred to as the Commis-
sion, for an order requirng the Commission to register 
certain securities of Continental. After a pre-trial hear-
ing held on September 4, 1958, the Third Judicial Dis-
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trict Court, in and for Salt Lake County, issued a judg-
lnent and decree dated September 24, 1958, in which it 
ordered the Commission to register the securities. The 
Commission appeals from that order. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Continental is a Utah corporation capitalized for 
1,000,000 shares of Class A common stock of a par value 
of $1.00 per share, and 2,500,000 shares of Class B com-
mon stock of a par value of 1¢ per share. The Articles 
of Incorporation (R. 9 to 15) provide that each share 
of Class A and Class B stock shall be entitled to one 
vote each at any shareholders' meeting. It is further 
provided that the Class A common stock shall be entitled 
to 100 times the amount paid in dividends as the Class 
B stock, and 100 times as much as the Class B stock on 
dissolution. This does not constitute a preferred right. 
Pursuant to Section 61-1-11, U.C.A. 1953, Continen-
tal filed an issuer's application with the Commission, 
seeking to register by qualification 500,000 shares of the 
Class A common stock to be sold to the public at a price 
of $1.00 per share. (R. 19-24). By letter dated December 
9, 1957, addressed to Continental's attorney (R. 25), the 
Commission denied the application. That letter is quoted 
in part as follows: 
It appears that the officers of the corporation 
have purchased 2,500,000 shares of Class B com-
mon at 1¢ per share for whirh they have paid 
$25,000. Five hundred [thousand] shares of Class 
[A] romn1on is to be offered to the public at $1.00 
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per share. Holders of both classes of stock are to 
have the one vote for each share; that is, the stock-
holder of Class A who pays $1.00 for one share 
will have the same vote as the holder of a share 
of Class B. stock who has paid 1¢ for his one 
share. Furthermore, the holders of the Class B. 
stock are always to control the corporation and 
also to control the Insurance Company and the Fi-
nance Company which you expect to establish with 
money derived from the proposed public offering. 
The promoters put into the corporation 
$25,000, the public will invest $500,000 and yet 
will hold a minority of the voting power. 
The Commission cannot approve such a pro-
posal and the application referred to is denied. 
(R. 25). 
The Commission made no formal findings of fact, con-
clusions and order. The above quoted letter constitutes 
the Commission's rejection of Continental's application. 
By letter dated December 20, 1957 (R. 26), Continen-
tal proposed to amend its application, and by letter dated 
December 24, 1957 (R. 28), the Commission rejected the 
proposed amendment, stating that it did not remedy 
the objections the Commission previously made. There-
after, Continental sought and obtained an order from 
the District Court requiring the Commission to register 
the securities. The parties hereto stipulated as to essen-
tial facts. That stipulation is a part of the record (R. 7 
and 8). 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE SECURITIES COMMISSION OF UTAH ACTED 
WITHIN ITS DISCRETIONARY POWERS IN DENYING RE-
SPONDENT'S APPLIC.NTION TO REGISTER THE SECUR-
ITIES BY QUALIFICATION. 
POINT II. 
THE PROPOSED SALE OF STOCK BY RESPONDENT 




THE SECURITIES COMMISSION OF UTAH ACTED 
WITHIN ITS DISCRETIONARY POWERS IN DENYING RE-
SPONDENT'S APPLIC.NTION TO REGISTER THE SECUR-
ITIES BY QUALIFICATION. 
The primary purpose for creating the Securities 
Commission of the State of Utah was that of protecting 
the public in the purchase of securities. There are implied 
discretionary powers vested in the Commission by virtue 
of its creation, its powers and duties. It is evident from 
certain penalties prescribed in the act, that the Legisla-
ture considerd the potential harn1 and injur~T to the pub-
lic possible in security sales. It is 1nade a felony to make 
a statmnent concerning the sale of securities which is 
false or willfully exaggerated or would haYe a tendency 
to give a less or greater apparent value to securities or 
property than such actually possesses. See Section 61-1-
28, U.C.A. 1953. It is also n1ade a felony for a person to 
publish an advertisen1ent by or on behalf of any person ' 
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who is not registered, Section 61-1-35, or to sell securities 
which are non-exempt and not registered, Section 61-1-36. 
The Utah Securities statute, Chapter 1, of Title 61, 
enacted in 1925, is primarily a merit statute, as distin-
guished from disclosure statutes, such as the federal 
security act; the difference in the two being that in the 
former the Commission is granted the power to reject the, 
registration if certain conditions and factors are present, 
and in the latter the securities will be registered 
regardless of their nature or manner of sale, so 
long as a full disclosure is made. 
As previously indicated, this appeal arose out of the 
Commission's rejection of Continental's application for 
registration of securities by qualification under the pro-
visions of Section 61-1-11, U.C.A. 1953. That section pro-
vides that all securities not entitled to be registered by 
notification shall be registered by qualification. It further 
provides as follows: 
The commssion may require the applicant to 
submit to the commission the following informa-
tion respecting the issuer, and such other informa-
tion as it may in its judgment deem necessary to 
enable it to ascertain whether such securities 
shall be registered pursuant to the provisions of 
this section : * * * 
There follow nine paragraphs specifying information to 
be submitted with the application. The last paragraph 
of the section provides as follows: 
If upon examination of any application the 
commission shall find that the sale of security 
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referred to therein would not be fraudulent or 
tend to work a fraud upon the purchaser, and that 
the enterprise or business of the issuer is not 
based upon unsound business principles, it shall, 
upon the payment of the fee provided in this sec-
tion, record the registration of such security in the 
register of securities, and thereupon such security 
so registered may be sold by the issuer, by any 
registered agent or any registered dealer who 
has notified the commission of his intention so to 
do in the manner provided in section 61-1-16, 
subject, however, to the further order of the com-
mission as hereinafter provided. Such registration 
shall be valid for a period of one year from the 
date of entry in the register of securities, unless 
sooner cancelled, suspended or revoked by the 
commission for good cause after notice to the 
issuer of the security. 
As the statute above quoted provides, the Commission 
may reject an application for registration where it would 
be fraudulent, tend to work a fraud, or is based on un-
sound business principles. It is submitted that the Com-
missions' discretionary powers to reject applications are 
not confined to strict definitions of fraud or unsound 
business principles as will be discussed hereinafter. 
Section 61-1-11, U.C.~-1. 1953, hereinabove quoted, has 
not previously been interpreted by this Court on the issue 
raised here. The Utah Securities law is substantially a 
copy of the Iowa Securities law, Chapter 502, Code of 
Iowa, 1958. ~lan~v of the sections of the two statutes are 
identical. In the Iowa Code the counterpart to our Sec-
tion 61-1-11, and fr01n which the latter was drawn, is 
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Section 502.7, Code of Iowa, 1958, formerly section 8581-
cS. The Iowa statute, Section 502.7, contains the identical 
language as that quoted above from Section 61-1-11 of 
our Code, see pages 5 and 6 of this brief. 
In a 1939 case, the Iowa Supreme Court interpreted 
provisions of the Iowa statute comparable to the Utah 
Securities law. See Independence Fund of North America 
vs. Miller (1939 Iowa), 285 N.W. 629. In that case the 
Secretary of State (the individual in Iowa occupying the 
position similar to the Securities Commission in Utah) 
denied the application of a corporation seeking to regis-
ter certain declarations of trust and agreements by qual-
ification. That case cannot be compared factually with 
the instant case, but statements of the court bear strongly 
upon the interpretation of the Utah statute. The Iowa 
Supreme ·Court affirmed the lower court which had up-
held the Secretary of State's action. The court made the 
following statement about the Iowa Securities Act in 
general: 
An examination of the Statute discloses that 
it seeks to attain its ends by regulating and licens-
ing the issuer and dealer and inspecting and 
licensing the security. In scope it differs from 
the acts of Pennsylvania and certain other states 
·which license the dealer without requiring the 
qualification of the security and from the Statutes 
of other jurisdictions some of which require only 
that the security be qualified and still others 
which are based solely upon fraud and require no 
qualification for either dealer or security. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
The Utah act, almost identical with the Iowa statute, 
likewise regulates and licenses the dealer and inspects 
and licenses the security. The court went on to say: 
* * * Of necessity the legislature was compelled 
to delegate to the Secretary of State, in his han-
dling of the details of the regulation and enforce-
ment of the act, discretion comparable to the com-
plexities of the situations it was designed to reme-
dy. Otherwise in this and other similar situations 
such legislation would be rendered practically 
impotent. * * * 
Then toward the end of the decision the following signifi-
cant statement is made: 
* * * Code Section 8581-c8 [comparable to section 
61-1-11 DCA 1953] directs the Secretary of State 
to find whether or not the sale of the security 
would be fraudulent or would work or tend to 
work a fraud upon the purchaser, or that the en-
terprise or business of the issuer is not based upon 
unsound business principles. Section 8581-c11 au-
thorizes the Secretary of State to forbid the sale 
of any security ,,-hen "in his opinion, the sale 
thereof would be unfair, unjust or inequitable to 
the purchaser thereof." 
Although the latter provision appears in the 
section relating to registration of dealers and 
salesmen, it is plain!~- indicative of the legislative 
construction of the forn1er. l'nder such construc-
tion the Secretar)- of State n1a~- refuse the regis-
tration of a seeurit~- if. in his opinion, it is unfair, 
unj u::-;t or inequitable. It is not essential that it be 
''fraudulent·· as this word is ordinarilY defined. 
Sine<' the Seeretan- of State is thus ~uthorized 
to use his judgment it is quite proper that stand-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
ards be established upon which to base such opin-
ion and judgment.*** 
This language is particularly significant because the 
court interprets the statute as giving the Secretary of 
State discretionary powers to reject applications to regis-
ter securities when they are unfair, unjust and inequit-
able. It is conceded that there are some differences in the 
Utah and Iowa security laws and that in some respects 
the Iowa Legislature has granted what appears to be 
broader powers. However, the statutes are identical in 
substance; the Utah statute was patterned after that of 
Iowa, they are both enactments for the purpose of pro-
tecting the public in the matter of security purposes, and 
they are essentially merit statutes. What is most signifi--
cant is that the Iowa Court, in construing the same section 
of their act as this court is called upon to analyze now, 
Section 61-1-11, went beyond the language of the section 
and found implied powers in the Secretary of State to 
reject the application where it was unfair, inequitable 
and unjust. 
The securities scheme proposed by the plaintiff's 
application is, on its face, unfair and inequitable. The 
potential harm to the buying public in such scheme is 
apparent on an analysis of plaintiff's application and 
articles of incorporation. Two promoters purchased all 
of the Class B stock (the 1¢ stock), 1,250,000 shares each. 
Their outlay, therefore, of $25,000.00 ($12,500.00 each) 
will enable them to excercise complete control over the 
policy, operations and management of the corporation. 
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The public, who is asked to invest $500,000.00 in the cor-
poration, therefore, contributes, as compared to the two 
promoters, 95 percent of the corporate capital, and ob-
tains only 20 percent of the voting power. This approach-
es a subterfuge. Why are the holders of Class A stock 
given ~ny vote; they acquire no effective voting power 
thereby. It is a sham which induces the public to believe 
they are buying securities possessing voting rights. 
It has been argued that this is similar to the issuance 
of preferred stock and that such is a common practice 
in corporate security issues. But this is not preferred 
stock; no preference right is granted, nor does the Class 
A stock possess cumulative rights. The provision in the 
Articles of Incorporation that holders of Class A stock 
are entitled to 100 times the amount of dividends paid on 
Class B stock and 100 times the amount paid on distribu-
tion is not effective protection. There is no guarantee 
that dividends will ever be paid. It is noted that the two 
promoters who purchased all of the Class B stock are 
also officers of the corporation. It is not uncommon in 
small corporations that dividends are never paid because 
officers' salaries and administrative expenses consume 
all profits. Another potential harn1 is that the promoters-
officers could call a 1neeting of stockholders, amend the 
Articles of Incorporation, and n1ake an assessment of 
all shares of ·Class A stock. 
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POINT II. 
THE PROPOSED SALE OF STOCK BY RESPONDEN'l' 
WOULD TEND TO WORK A FRAUD ON THE PURCHASING 
PUBLIC. 
Section 61-1-11, U.C.A. 1953, hereinabove discussed, 
and quoted in part, includes the provision that the Conl-
mission may not register securities if the sale of such 
would "tend to work a fraud on the purchaser". That 
phrase "tend to work a fraud" is not commonly defined 
in the texts or the decisions. Obviously it was intended 
to have some meaning or it would not have been included; 
and it must have a meaning different from "fraudulent" 
or the two terms would not both have been included. The 
term "tend" has the following synonyms and definitions: 
"Stretch", "relate to", "to be directed to or have a tend-
ency, conscious or unconscious, to any end, object or 
purpose.'' Webster's New International Dictionary, 2nd 
Edition. By reason, the phrase means something less than 
"fraudulent"; the use of the term "tends" compels that 
conclusion. The essence of fraud is misrepresentation. 
This phrase therefore might be said to mean tends to 
misrepresent. 
It is submitted that the proposed scheme goes beyond 
the point of unfairness and "tends to work a fraud on the 
purchaser." in the following particulars: First, the Class 
A stock is advertised and sold as possessing a voting 
right, when as a practical matter 83% of the voting stock 
is held by two of the promoters. The voting right acquired 
therefore by Class A stockholders is meaningless. Second, 
the public is also informed that the Class A stock is 
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guaranteed to receive 100 times the amount of dividends 
and 100 times the amount paid on distribution as the 
Class B stock. However, as previously stated, the stock 
has no preferred or cumulative right, and more signifi-
cantly there is no assurance that any dividend will ever 
be paid. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of the 
1 ower court should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted 
E. R. CALLISTER 
Attorney General 
GARY L. THEURER 
Assitant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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